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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction existed in the district court under Utah Code§ 78A-5-102(1).
Appellate jurisdiction exists under Utah Code § 78A-4-l 03(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE No. 1:

& STANDARD OF REVIEW

Evidence not considered in the district court cannot be considered on

appeal. Chuck's appeal relies entirely on evidence that the district court deemed untimely
and refused to consider. The court deemed the evidence untimely because it was available
the day the lawsuit was filed but was not offered until six years after litigation began and
nearly a year after trial. Can Chuck's appeal prevail where there is no evidence available
on appeal to support it?

Standard of Review for Issue No. 1: Challenges to standing are reviewed using
the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation. 1 Legal
determinations regarding standing are reviewed for correctness, but factual findings
underlying jurisdictional issues are reviewed for clear error.2 In addition, jurisdiction is
presumed after a judgment has been entered, and the burden of demonstrating a lack of

-a

jurisdiction lies with the party attacking jurisdiction. 3

Preservation: Chuck's standing argument was not preserved. While standing is a
jurisdictional issue that cannot be waived, for all intents and purposes Chuck waived this
particular standing argument by failing to timely offer evidence to support it. Evidence
supporting this argument was not offered until nearly a year after trial and the district
1

Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,115,228 P.3d 747.
Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ,I 6, 269 P.3d 958 (internal citations omitted).
3
Id.
2

court refused to consider it.

4

In addition, Chuck did not preserve the majority of the remaining arguments he
raises on appeal. In the lower court, Chuck requested relief from judgment under Rule
60(b )(4) through 60(b )( 6) only and based each corresponding argument on evidence that
the court deemed untimely and refused to consider. All other arguments were not
preserved.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

(l)(a) A person may not bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for
the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation, for any act done or service rendered
if the act or service is prohibited under this chapter.
(b) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(a), a person may bring or maintain an
action in any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation if
the person is:
(i) a principal broker;
(ii) an individual that was licensed as a principal broker at the time the act
or service that is the subject of the lawsuit was performed; or

(iii) an entity that, under the records of the Division of Real Estate, is
affiliated with a principal broker.
(2)(a) A sales agent or associate broker may not sue in that individual's own name
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom the sales
agent or associate broker is or was affiliated.
(b) An action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may
only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom a sales agent or
5
associate broker is affiliated.

4

5

See pp. 7-20, infra.
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2f-409 (2015).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATlJRE OF THE CASE, STATEMENT OF FACTS, AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

This appeal arises out of a real estate brokerage's attempt to collect a commission.
The real estate brokerage consists of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy
Corporation, and Skip Wing as their principal broker (this brief refers to these parties
collectively as Aspenwood or the Aspenwood Plaintiffs). Aspenwood alleged that it
entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement with the defendants Still
Standing Stable, LC, Chuck Schvaneveldt, and Cathy Code, and that Aspenwood earned
a commission under that FSBO agreement.
The real estate agent representing Aspenwood in the transaction was Tim Shea. 6
At the time the FSBO was signed, Shea worked for Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation,
which was doing business as Remax Elite with Skip Wing as the principal broker. 7
Aspenwood Real Estate later became Elite Legacy Corporation, which also did business
as Remax Elite with Skip Wing as the principal broker. 8 Skip has since retired, 9 while
Tim has moved to Colorado. 10 Both Aspenwood Real Estate and Elite Legacy have
~

ceased operating and will conclude their winding up phase as soon as this litigation
ends. I I

6

E.g., R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24.

7

vJ

R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:26.
9
R. at 8384, p. 164:13-18.
10
R. at 8385, p. 86: 12-13.
II See R. at 1092; 1483-85.

8

3

1.1

The commission claim's factual background

In September, 1998, Still Standing bought a property located in Weber County
(the Property). 12 Around early 2006, Chuck began making efforts to sell the Property. 13 A
real estate agent working for Aspenwood, Tim Shea, approached Chuck with potential
buyers for the Property.

14

In February, 2006, Shea and Chuck entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner
Commission Agreement. 15 Under that FSBO Agreement, Chuck agreed to pay a
commission equal to 3 % of the purchase price if he accepted an offer to purchase the
Property .16 Shea signed the FSBO as an agent of Remax Elite. 17 About two weeks later,
Chuck signed a REPC and accepted an offer to purchase the Property. 18
As the closing date approached, Chuck indicated that he would be providing a
special warranty deed at closing, not a general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 19
The special warranty deed would not guarantee access to the Property. 20
After learning that Chuck would not fulfill his contractual obligation to provide a
general warranty deed, the Buyer decided not to go through with the deal. 21 Nevertheless,

12

R. at 2900.
R. at 8385, pp. 87:1-92:18.
14
R. at 8385, pp. 92:2-95:13.
15
Cathy Code signed the FSBO on Chuck's behalf, and the jury found that Chuck ratified
that signature. R. at 5388-89.
16 Id.,, 2.
11 Id.
18
Br. of Appellant, Ex. 2, § 25.
19
R. at2913-15; 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19, 187:17-188:3.
20
R. at 2913-15.
21 Id.
13

4

Chuck attempted to complete the transaction by showing up at closing and signing the
closing documents. 22
1.2

The commission claim's procedural history

In November, 2006, "Remax Elite" (a dba designation) filed a petition seeking
declaratory relief regarding whether Remax Elite should deliver earnest money to the
buyer or the seller after the failed real estate transaction. 23 Nearly two years later, Remax
Elite asserted a claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy claiming that Remax had
earned a commission under the FSBO. 24
The Defendants tenaciously opposed Remax' s capacity to sue them, claiming in at
least eight pretrial motions that "Remax Elite," as nothing more than a dba designation,
~

did not have standing to sue. 25 Specifically, the Defendants argued that "Remax Elite"
was an expired dba (thus violating the assumed-name statute/6 and that only Remax
Elite's principal broker Skip Wing had standing to recover the commission. 27 At one
point, Chuck even submitted a summary judgment motion asserting as undisputed fact
that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal broker and the only principal broker
involved in the transaction. 28
The Defendants' efforts to dismiss the case under their "expired dba" argument

22

R. at 367.
R. at 1-4.
24
R. at 660-64.
25
R.at 1256-83; 1407-62;2068-104;2120-36;2390-414;2548-53;2614-22;2653-60.
26
E.g., R. at 2400-03.
27
E.g., R. at 1256-83; 1407-62; 2068-104; 2120-36; 2390-414; 2548-53; 2614-22;
2653-60.
28
R. at 1408.
23

5

included investigating the Remax Elite dba's registration documents. For example, Chuck
argued in a summary judgment motion and a motion requesting mediation that the FSBO
commission claim should be dismissed due to expiration of the Remax Elite dba. 29 To
support his assertion that the dba had expired, Chuck attached corresponding registration
documents he accessed from the Utah Department of Commerce. 30
Eventually the "expired dba" argument and other motions regarding standing were
resolved by adding the Aspenwood Plaintiffs (i.e., Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation,
Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal broker Skip Wing). 31 After Aspenwood was
added, the Defendants abandoned their standing arguments voluntarily. 32 The case then
proceeded to trial, where Aspenwood prevailed against Chuck while both Still Standing
and Cathy were dismissed. 33
After trial, the court turned to resolution of the parties' claims for attorney fees.
During the dispute over attorney fees, Skip asserted that he was involved in the case as a
representative only and therefore should not be personally liable for Cathy Code's award
of attorney fees. 34 This included pointing out to the court that Skip had never signed the
FSBO; Shea signed it on behalf of Remax Elite. 35 Because Skip was not a party to the
FSBO, he asserted that he could not be personally liable under the FSBO's attorney-fee

29

E.g., R. at 2123-24; 2400-03.

30

R. at 1451; 2134-36; 2411-12.
R. at 3591-604.
32
R. at 7015.
33
R. at 5423-25; 5388-89; 5613-14.
34
R. at 6780-90.
35
R. at 6783-86.
31

6

provision. 36
In a complete surprise to Aspenwood~ pointing out the innocuous and obvious fact
that Skip never signed the FSBO triggered over a year and a half of post-trial litigation.
~

According to Chuck, this "admission~~ from Aspenwood somehow spurred him to
investigate who owned the Remax Elite dba, 37 despite the fact that the dba's status had
"vexed the entire litigation" 38 and Chuck had already looked up the dba's registration
documents nearly three and a half years earlier. 39
1.3

The flood of post-trial Quinlan motions

Chuck's belated inquiry into the registration documents convinced him that Dale
Quinlan was somehow involved in the failed real estate transaction. 40 Thus ten months
\i1

after the trial ended Chuck submitted a motion to dismiss based on this previously
unreferenced Quinlan evidence. 41 Chuck suggested that Quinlan had owned the Remax
. Elite dba at the time Chuck signed the FSBO, and therefore Chuck was somehow
contracting with Quinlan rather than Aspenwood. 42 The district court responded to this
motion harshly: "This is precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary [sic] motion that

~

justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to
languish on the court's docket for years." 43

Id.
Br. of Appellant, 8-9.
38 Id., 9.
39
R. at 1451; 2134-36; 2400-03; 2411-12.
40
R. at 6867-72.
41
R. at 6864-66
42
R. at 6867-72.
43
R. at 7012. Addendum, Ex. A.
36

37

7

This motion turned out to be the first of several "cumulative and unnecessary"
motions based on the Quinlan evidence. In the end, Chuck filed six post-trial motionseach relying on nearly identical '~facts'~ and legal arguments. 44 Chuck pursued these
motions one after another under every conceivably applicable rule of civil procedure.
Resolving them took a year and a half. 45
While this appeal concerns only the fourth of these six motions, the resolution of
all six motions matters here, for two reasons:: 1) the Court refused in each instance to
admit the Quinlan evidence, making that evidence unavailable for appeal; and 2) the
order that Chuck appeals relied on rulings and findings in the previous post-trial orders.
1.3.1 The first post-trial Quinlan motion

Chuck's first post-trial motion claimed that the new Quinlan evidence showed that
Quinlan had originally owned the Remax Elite dba. 46 According to Chuck, this somehow
made Quinlan Remax Elite's principal broker and the only party entitled to seek the
FSBO commission.

47

The district court absolutely refused to consider the untimely Quinlan evidence:
"Raising this question of fact concerning the standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is
unwarranted .... Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a jury trial and six months
after entry of judgment will not be permitted." 48

44

R.at6864-66;6987-93;7088-90;7287-93;7876-91;8110-22.
The first Quinlan motion was filed on June 28, 2013 (R. at 6864-66) and the final
Quinlan motion was resolved in an order entered December 29, 2014 (R. at 8452-54).
46
R. at 6867.
47
R. at 6869-71.
48
R. at 7013. Ex. A.
45

8

In reaching its decision, the court faulted Chuck for failing to explain why he had
failed to discover the Quinlan evidence earlier: '~Even if this motion were timely, [Chuck]
has provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in
vP

time for a Rule 59 motion." 49 In addition-and making Chuck's burden on appeal much
more difficult to overcome-the court made this critical factual finding: "It is beyond
belief that [Chuck] could not have discovered this evidence with due diligence." 50
And the court did not stop there. It also noted that even if the Quinlan evidence
were considered, that evidence was irrelevant: Skip Wing, not Dale Quinlan, was the
principal broker associated with the FSB0. 51 Further, the court found that both
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation owned the Remax

~

Elite dba. 52 Finally, the court ruled that Chuck had waived his allegations of forgery and
fraud because he had failed to raise them earlier in the litigation. 53
·· Based on its refusal to consider the new evidence and its other findings and
rulings, the court denied the motion. 54 The court concluded its order by stating "The court
is satisfied that this case is closed. " 55 Chuck has not appealed any ruling associated with

viP

this first motion.
1.3.2 The second post-trial Quinlan motion
Three weeks after Chuck filed his first post-trial motion to dismiss, Chuck and
Id.
Id.
51
R. at 7013-14. Ex. A.
52
R. at 7015. Ex. A.
53
R. at 7014. Ex. A.
54
R. at 7016. Ex. A.
55
R. at 7017. Ex. A.
49

50

9

Still Standing filed a second motion to dismiss based on a purported settlement
agreement. 56 This motion claimed that Quinlan and the Defendants had reached a
settlement agreement regarding the FSBO commission. 57
Again, the district court absolutely refused to consider the Quinlan evidence:
[T]his court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment ...
."

58

Moreover, the court found that Chuck once again had failed to explain why he could

not have discovered the Quinlan evidence earlier. 5~ The court called this failure a "fatal
flaw" to considering the Quinlan evidence. 60
For these two reasons, the court denied the motion. 61 In addition, the court denied
the motion on the ground that the purported settlement claim did not mandate dismissal:
[E]ven if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier,
settling a claim that could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate
that the plaintiffs in this case did not have standing to assert their claims. At
best the new evidence would raise a material question of fact concerning
proper ownership of the commission claim. 62
This order, like the first order dealing with Quinlan issues, concluded by stating
"The court is satisfied that this case is closed. " 63 Chuck has not appealed any ruling
associated with this second motion.

56

R. at 6987-93.
Id.
R. at 7147.
59
R. at 7148. Addendum, Ex. B.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.

51
58

10

1.3.3 The third post-trial Quinlan motion
Three weeks after filing the second motion, Chuck submitted a third motion based
on the Quinlan evidence. 64 In this third motion, Chuck asked the court under Rule 52 to
amend the findings in the final judgment, asserting that the judgment should be revised to
reflect that Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and was therefore the contracting
party in the FSBO. 65

-L l response, the district court refused a third time to consider the Quinlan
evidence: "[T]he Court's ruling is that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new
evidence. " 66 In reaching its conclusion, the court found-for the third time-that Chuck
could have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence:
[T]he information, specifically the documentation from the Department of
Corporations, and ... challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted,
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was
conducted in this case. 67
Once again, the court did not simply dismiss the motion based on exclusion of the
Quinlan evidence and Chuck's lack of diligence. Here, the court also pointed out that
even if the Quinlan evidence were considered, the court was required to construe that
evidence in favor of the judgment. 68 Indeed, the court proceeded to rule on this issue,
stating that it construed the evidence in a way that supported the judgment: considering

64

R.
R.
66
R.
67
R.
68
R.
65

at 7088-90.
at 7093-104.
at 8238. Addendum, Ex. C.
at 8237. Ex. C.
at 823 8--42. Ex. C.
11

all the evidence, Quinlan was an employee and agent for the plaintiff corporations and
Quinlan's involvement with the dba was limited to his capacity as an employee or
representative of the true owners, the business entities. 69 Chuck has not appealed any
ruling associated with this third motion.

1.3.4 The fourth post-trial Quinlan motion (Rule 60(b))
One month after submitting the third motion, Chuck submitted a fourth motion,
this time requesting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). 70 This is the motion before
the Court on appeal. Here Chuck asserted that Dale Quinlan, as the purported owner of
the Remax Elite dba, was the only party entitled to pursue the FSBO commission;
therefore the plaintiffs never had standing to pursue the commission claim and the claim
had been settled between Quinlan and the Defendants. 71
Chuck's argument focused on Rule 60(b) subsections 4 through 6. 72 While the
motion itself states that it requests relief under subsections two through six, 73 Chuck's
supporting memorandum provided analysis and argument regarding subsections four
through six only. 74 Indeed, the court expressly noted in both its oral ruling and written
order that Chuck did not request relief under 60(b )(2), the subsection allowing relief
based on newly discovered evidence. 75 In addition, because Chuck did not raise Rule
60(b)(3) as a ground for relief the district court did not address Rule 60(b )(3) in its oral
69

R.
R.
71
R.
72
R.
73
R.
74
R.
75
R.
70

at 8241--42. Ex. C.
at 7287-94.
at 7311-18.
at 7314-19; 8256.
at 7291-92.
at 7314-19.
at 8255-56; 8446 pp. 46:24--47:16.
12

ruling or written order. 76
In his supporting memorandum, Chuck acknowledged that the court had earlier
excluded the corresponding Quinlan evidence based on timeliness, stating that he filed
this motion "to put the facts and law squarely before the Court for a ruling on the
record." 77 Chuck claimed this motion was timely for three reasons. First, Chuck stressed
that he had filed the Rule 60 motion within three months of the final judgment, which
would make the motion timely under subsections (1) through (3 ). 78 Second, Chuck
claimed (without elaboration) that the motion was brought within a reasonable time
because he had exercised due diligence throughout discovery. 79 Third, Chuck blamed
Aspenwood for his failure to learn of Quinlan's purportedly critical involvement with the

FSB0. 80
Notably, Chuck provided no legal argument, analysis, or citation to authority
regarding whether Aspenwood's allegedly fraudulent acts justified relief from judgment
under Rule 60(b)(3). 81 Instead, Chuck raised these issues solely to establish that his
motion was timely and properly before the court. 82
After arguing that the motion was properly before the court, Chuck then requested
relief from the judgment under 60(b )( 5), asserting that the judgment against him had been

76

R. at 8254-69; 8446 pp. 45:6-58:5.
R. at 7294.
78
R. at 7311-13.
77

vJ
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Id.

80

Id.

Id.
82 Id.
81
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satisfied. 83 Chuck's analysis on this point was less than clear, but his argument boiled
down to this:
•

Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba at the time the FSBO was signed,
therefore Quinlan was Remax Elite and the "true party to the FSBO."

•

The FSBO requires Remax Elite (i.e., Quinlan) to mediate before
proceeding to litigation.

•

Quinlan mediated with the Defendants and settled his purported right to the
comm1ss1on.

•

Because the party that was truly entitled to the commission claim (Quinlan)
settled that claim, the judgment had been satisfied. 84

Next Chuck requested relief from the judgment under 60(b)(4) because
Aspenwood had allegedly failed to prove that it had standing. 85 This argument was
essentially identical to Chuck's argument under 60(b)(5):
•

Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba at the time the FSBO was signed,
therefore Quinlan was the "only Remax contracting party when the FSBO
was signed."

•

Because Quinlan was "the only Remax contracting party," only Quinlan
had the right under the FSBO to pursue a commission.

•

Quinlan never transferred his ownership of the dba or the commission
claim to Aspenwood, and documents purporting to transfer the dba were
fraudulent.

•

Because only Quinlan had the right to pursue the commission and never
transferred that right to Aspenwood, Aspenwood did not have standing to
· · 86
pursue th e comm1ss1on.

83

R. at 7314.
Id.
R. at 7315-18.
86 Id.

84
85
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Finally, Chuck turned to Rule 60(b)( 6), the rule's catch-all provision. 87 Once
again, Chuck's argument here was somewhat hard to follow. But Chuck's first point
under 60(b )( 6) apparently did not request relief from the commission judgment at all, but
concerned earlier rulings dismissing Chuck's claims against the real estate agent Tim
Shea: "Seller's side should be allowed to supplement earlier motions with testimony from
Dale Quinlan to explain why Seller's side was damaged by the conduct of an incompetent
agent and broker .... Dale Quinlan could testify regarding the duties of the agent. " 88Chuck' s second (and final) point under 60(b)(6) mostly repeated his earlier
arguments:
•

Quinlan-not Aspenwood-was the true FSBO contracting party.

•

The FSBO required the parties to mediate before going to court.

•

Quinlan never participated in mediation.

•

As a result, the mediation provision had never been complied with.

•

This violation of the mediation provision required dismissal of
Aspenwood's claim. 89

Thus, while Chuck's motion mentioned 60(b)(2) (new evidence) and (3) (fraud),
as grounds for relief, Chuck's supporting memorandum provided no supporting legal
authority, legal argument, or analysis concerning why he was entitled to relief under
these subsections. 90 And while Chuck did provide some legal argument under subsections
four through six, those arguments were essentially identical, each presupposing that the
~

87

R.
R.
89
R.
90
R.
88

at 7318-19.
at 7318.
at 7319.
at 7310-20.
15

Quinlan evidence was admitted, that the Quinlan evidence was undisputed, and that the
Quinlan evidence somehow established Quinlan as a party to the FSBO and the true
claimholder. 91
The Quinlan evidence that Chuck offered to support his 60(b) motion consisted of
four exhibits containing these documents:
•

an affidavit from Quinlan statin~ that he had never transferred his rights
under the FSBO to Aspenwood; 2

•

a purported settlement agreement between Quinlan and the Defendants
settling the FSBO commission claim; 93

•

an "Expert Forgery Report" (offered years after the expert discovery
deadline) purporting to establish that Quinlan's transfer of the Remax Elite
dba to Aspenwood was based on forged signatures; 94 and

•

a letter from the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code dated
December 11, 2013 (filed after briefing as a "Supplemental Exhibit"),
stating that the ownership of the Remax Elite dba has been returned to Dale
Quinlan. 95

Aspenwood responded to this fourth attempt to introduce the Quinlan evidence by
arguing that the motion could be resolved entirely under 60(b)(2), i.e., the subsection
allowing relief based on new evidence that could not have been discovered earlier with
due diligence. 96 Where Chuck's entire argument rested on the new Quinlan evidence,
Chuck's motion could prevail only under 60(b )(2). 97

91

R. at 7314-20.
R. at 7327-31.
93
R. at 7322-25.
94
R. at 7333-51.
95
R. at 7731-37.
96
R. at 7454-57.
91 Id.

92
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Aspenwood also argued that the Quinlan evidence should not be considered
because Chuck did not exercise due diligence searching for the Quinlan evidence. 98
Chuck had approximately six years to conduct discovery before trial. 99 The documents
showing Quinlan's involvement with the Remax Elite dba were a matter of public record,
and could have been discovered the day the lawsuit was filed. 100 Aspenwood also pointed
out that Chuck had failed to identify what steps he had taken to acquire the Quinlan
evidence before trial ai1d how those steps amounted to due diligence. 101 Finally,
Aspenwood noted that the district court had already found-more than once-that Chuck
could have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence. 102
In addition to its argument under 60(b )(2), Aspenwood argued that under the
"

principal-broker statute, only the principal broker associated with a sales agent has
statutory standing to pursue a commission claim on the agent's behalf. 103 In this case, all
testimony-before, during, and after trial-showed that Aspenwood was the principal
broker associated with the real estate agent Tim Shea. 104
Aspenwood also provided testimony and documents refuting Chuck's fraud
allegations. 105 This evidence showed that Quinlan never had any right to the Remax Elite
dba, that Quinlan ceased functioning as Aspenwood's principal broker seven months

98

R. at 7455-58.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103
R. at 7465-67.
104 Id.
105
R. at 7494-96; 7996-8033.
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before the FSBO was signed, that Quinlan had left the company roughly 17 months
before the interpleader action was amended to add the FSBO commission claim, and that
the Remax Elite dba had been registered in the name of Aspenwood Real Estate
Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation. 106
The court denied Chuck's motion and refused to consider the Quinlan evidence,
just as it had the previous three times:
L

.The Court's observation9fthis case, from the review of the proceedings up
to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is that this issue
of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right therefore to
effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign them, or
compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after trial. ...
None of those issues have ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to
the Court, and the Court, in light of both the timing of its presentation, the
fact that Mr. Quinlan's involvement, both in the business entity and in the
registration of the dba, is a matter of public record that has existed for many
years, and questions that the Court has raised with respect to these
documents, the Court will simply not countenance the legal argument that
Mr. Quinlan is effectively the superseding entity with respect to these
claims, and that argument is not given further legal consideration by the
Court. 107

1.3.5 The fifth post-trial Quinlan motion
Over eight months after filing the fourth Quinlan motion, Chuck and Still Standing
together filed a "Stipulated" Motion to Release Bond.

108

This motion asserted that Still

Standing was the assignee, through Dale Quinlan, of all rights under the FSBO, including
the right to pursue the FSBO commission claim. 109 As the purported sole owner of the
FSBO commission claims, Still Standing and Chuck had reached a "stipulated"
106

R. at 7996-8033.
R. at 8264-65 (emphasis added). Addendum, Ex. D.
108
R. at 7876-90.
109 Id.

107
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agreement to release Chuck's supersedeas bond. 110 To support this argument, the motion
relied on the already-rejected Quinlan evidence and offered that evidence as undisputed
fact.111

Unsurprisingly, the court denied the motion and refused to consider the Quinlan
evidence:
There have been significant steps taken by the defendant in this case
to construct an alternative set of facts which would give Mr. Quinlan
certain rights under this judgment and purport to assign those rights to him.
None of those have been established properly by the Court, and the findings
which were previously made by the Court as to the holders of the claim
remain undisturbed. And therefore, Mr. Quinlan does not have authority to
act on behalf of the holders of the claim, based upon the Court's denying
the request to modify the prior rulings, and therefore is not a proper party
with authority to stipulate on issues relating to the bond or any other
disposition of the claim. And so that motion is denied. 112

1.3.6 The sixth post-trial Quinlan motion
One last attempt was made to introduce the Quinlan evidence, this time by Still
Vii

Standing. In this sixth attempt, Still Standing moved the court to substitute Still Standing
as the plaintiff and "true claimholder" under Rule 25.

113

Still Standing filed this motion

despite an order from the court entered two days earlier stating that the court would not
consider any "alternative set of facts" under which Quinlan might have rights to the
judgment in this case, including the capacity to assign rights to others.
The district court refused to depart from its earlier rulings:

Id.
111 Id.
110

R . at 8245. Addendum, Ex. E.
113
R. at 8112.
114
R. at 8245.
112
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114

Defendants' Rule 25(c) motion raises an issue essentially identical to an
issue that the Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still
Standing Stables, as the asserted current owner of the dba "Remax Elite,"
either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate administrative
determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control
the judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the
evidence and arguments supporting these assertions ofStill Standing
Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not now profierly
before the court. The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. 15
In short, the district court has never departed from its original ruling on the
Quinlan.evidence: the evidence is untimely and has never been properly before the court.

1.4

Quinlan's actual involvement with the case and the dba

Aspenwood maintains that no evidence concerning Quinlan was admitted below
and therefore cannot be considered here. In addition, Aspenwood notes that Chuck failed
to marshal any evidence contradicting his Quinlan claims. Aspenwood provides that
evidence here, which Aspenwood offered in opposition to the 60(b) motion. 116 But
Aspenwood does not abandon its position that no evidence regarding Quinlan should be
considered on appeal and that Chuck's argument fails because he did not marshal any
evidence supporting the findings below.
In May 2003, a group including Skip Wing, Shane Thorpe, and Dale Quinlan
established Aspenwood Real Estate, LLC, (Aspenwood LLC) a real estate company. 117
Later, sometime in 2004, Aspenwood LLC entered into a franchise agreement with
Remax International and received the right to conduct business under the name "Remax

115

R. at 8453-54 (emphasis added). Addendum, Ex. F.
R. at 7494-96; 7996-8033.
117
R. at 7997.

116
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Elite." 118 Aspenwood LLC assigned Quinlan-in his capacity as an Aspenwood LLC
employee-to register this dba in the company's name. 119 Quinlan registered the dba, but
mistakenly listed himself, rather than Aspenwood LLC, as the dba's owner. 120
Five months later, in May, 2005, Aspenwood LLC converted to Aspenwood Real
Estate Corporation, one of the plaintiffs in this case. 121 At the time of the conversion,
Quinlan was serving as Aspenwood's principal broker. 122 Just one month later, however,
Quinlan stepped down as principal broker and became Aspenwood's corporate
secretary. 123 Skip Wing replaced Quinlan as Aspenwood's principal broker. 124 Shortly
after Quinlan ceased serving as Aspenwood' s principal broker, Quinlan lost his broker's
license. 125 Although Quinlan no longer had a broker license, he continued working for
\JP

Aspenwood as a real estate agent. 126 This switch from Quinlan to Skip as principal broker
occurred roughly eight months before the FSBO and REPC at issue were signed. 127
Quinlan's loss of his broker's license occurred roughly seven months before the FSBO
and REPC at issue were signed. 128
A few months after Quinlan shifted from principal broker to corporate secretary,
118

See R. at 7999-8000.
R. at 8000.
120 Id.
121
R. at 7997-98.
122 Id.
123
R. at 7998, f~ 10-11.
124 Id
125 Id.
126
Skip became the principal broker in June 2005, the FSBO and REPC were signed in or
around February 2006.
127
Quinlan lost his broker's license in July 2005, the FSBO and REPC were signed in or
around February 2006.
128
R. at 8000, ,r 18.
119
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Aspenwood negotiated with Remax International to establish a new Rem~-x franchise in
South Ogden. 129 During the due diligence process, Remax International discovered that
the Remax Elite dba had been registered in Quinlan's name. 130 Remax International
required that this mistake be corrected before it would agree to authorize another Remax
franchise.

131

To correct the mistake, Aspenwood gave Quinlan, in his capacity as corporate
secretary, the assignment to fix the incorrect registration.

132

Quinlan attempted to do

s0

by sending a letter to the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code (DCCC). 133 In
his letter, Quinlan asked DCCC to transfer ownership of Aspenwood Real Estate
Corporation itself to Shane Thorpe, stating that "Aspenwood Real Estate is DBA
RE/MAX ELITE. "

134

The letter was ineffective because it attempted to transfer

ownership of Aspenwood Real Estate, not ownership of the Remax Elite dba.
So Quinlan sent a second letter. 135 This letter got it right, instructing DCCC to
transfer the Remax Elite dba from Quinlan to Aspenwood Real Estate. 136 In this letter,
Quinlan stated that "RE/MAX Elite is the DBA for Aspenwood Real Estate Corp." 137
DCCC made the requested change and the Remax Elite dba was officially registered in

Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132
R. at 8001-02.
133 Id.
134
R. at 8001; 8028.
135
R. at 8001; 8030.
136 Id.
131 Id.

129
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Aspenwood Real Estate's name on :tvfarch 9, 2006. 138 This transfer occurred roughly one
month after the FSBO and REPC at issue were signed. After the transfer was complete,
Remax International authorized Aspenwood to establish a new Remax franchise in
addition to Remax Elite. 139
In December of that year, one month after this case was first filed as an
interpleader, Quinlan sold his ownership interest in the company.

140

Although Quinlan

was no longer an owner, he continued to work for Aspenwood as a ground-level real
estate agent. 141 One month after Quinlan sold his ownership interest in Aspenwood, the
Remax Elite name was transferred one more time, this time by Aspenwood Real Estate to
Elite Legacy Corporation, another plaintiff in this action.

142

Three months after that, Quinlan left his agent position with Aspenwood.

143

From

that time on, Quinlan had nothing to do with Aspenwood Real Estate or Elite Legacy.

144

He took no files or clients with him. 145 He also never claimed-until a year after the trial
in this case-that he had a right to the Remax Elite dba. 146 And he has yet to claim an
interest in any of Aspenwood's many other commissions earned under the name Remax
Elite.

138

R. at 7734.
R. at 8001.
140
R. at 7999.
141 Id.
142
R. at 8032.
143
R. at 7999.
144 Id.
14s Id.
146 Id.
139
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1.5

Skip Wing, the principal broker actually associated with the FSBO

In contrast to the untimely, post-trial Quinlan evidence, the evidence produced at
trial established that Skip Wing was the principal broker associated with the failed real
estate transaction and that Skip's real estate brokerages owned the Remax Elite dba.
Evidence of this was admitted without objection at trial, where Skip Wing testified that
he was Remax Elite's principal broker 147 and that the Remax Elite dba belonged to his
brokerages (the plaintiffa Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation and Elite Legacy
Corporation). 148 In addition, Tim Shea (the real estate agent who signed the FSBO)
testified at trial that he worked for Remax Elite and that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's
principal broker.

149

In contrast, no party attempted to introduce evidence at trial showing that
Aspenwood did not own the Remax Elite dba, that the Remax Elite dba was not properly
registered, or that Skip Wing was not the principal broker associated with Tim Shea.
Indeed, Chuck's own counsel throughout trial constantly referred to Remax Elite and the
Aspenwood Plaintiffs interchangeably, including referring to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's
principal broker. 150 At one point Chuck's counsel even proposed a jury instruction that
referred to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's broker. 151

147

R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15.
R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21; see also R. at 8384, p. 172:5-12.
149
R. at 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
150
E.g., R. at 8384, 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385, pp.
64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:14-16.
151
R. at 8384, p. 67:8-19.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

Chuck's arguments fail on threshold grounds.

Chuck's standing argument fails because there is no evidence available on appeal
to support it and Chuck has not appealed the exclusion of that evidence. Chuck's
remaining arguments fail because Chuck failed to raise them below.

II.

Aspenwood has standing.

At this stage of litigation, Chuck may establish that Aspenwood does not have
standing only if no evidence exists to support Aspenwood's standing. Evidence was
introduced at trial showing that Skip Wing was the proper principal broker to bring the
claim and that the plaintiffs were operating under the properly registered Remax Elite
~

dba. No conflicting evidence was offered until nearly a year after trial, and the district
court deemed the evidence untimely and refused to consider it. As a result, substantial
evidence establishes that Aspenwood has standing, no conflicting evidence exists, and
Chuck's standing argument fails.

III.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion.

Chuck's arguments for relief under Rule 60(b) are merely extensions of his
standing argument. Like the standing argument, these arguments fail because there is no
evidence available to support them. And even if the Quinlan evidence is considered, the
district court did not abuse its discretion for three reasons: 1) the Quinlan evidence is
irrelevant-Aspenwood has statutory standing even if Quinlan owned the dba; 2)
evidence regarding Quinlan must be evaluated in the light most favorable to Aspenwood,
and the evidence establishes that Quinlan had no right to the Remax Elite dba and had no

25

involvement in this case whatsoever; and 3) at best, the Quinlan evidence establishes only
that the FSBO parties acted under the mistake of fact that Aspenwood owned the Remax
Elite dba.
ARGUMENT

I.

Chuck's appeal fails on threshold grounds.

A. The Quinlan evidence is not available on appeal.
Chuck's appeal fails hecause it relies on unavailable evidence. Under Utah law,
evidence that is not considered by the district court cannot be considered on appeal. 152
In this case, Chuck's appeal relies wholly on the Quinlan evidence. His entire brief
presupposes that the Quinlan evidence was admitted below and that the Quinlan evidence
is available on appeal. Indeed, without the Quinlan evidence, Chuck's arguments make
no sense: He cannot claim that only Quinlan has standing, that Quinlan settled the FSBO
commission claim, and so on if the available evidence does not even mention Quinlan.
And the available evidence does not mention Quinlan. As far as this appeal is concerned,
Dale Quinlan does not exist. Evidence regarding Quinlan was not even offered below
until Chuck and others tried-at least six times-to admit the Quinlan evidence,
beginning a year after trial. 153 The district court refused to consider it-every time.
Because the district court never considered the Quinlan evidence, Chuck cannot
152

Pilcher v. Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 663 P .2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted
in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered here.") (citing Corbet v. Corbet,
472 P.2d 430,433 (1970) ("On Appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders
appealed from on the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do not
fermit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court.")).
53
See pp. 7-20, supra.
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turn to that e·vidence on appeal. Without this foundational evidence, Chuck's appeal
collapses. Each and every argument depends on the unavailable Quinlan evidence and
therefore Chuck's appeal fizzles from the start.

B. Chuck did not preserve his arguments for appeal.
Chuck's arguments on appeal look nothing like his arguments in the lower court.
Arguments not raised in the lower court will not be considered for the first time on
appeal.154
In the lower court, Chuck argued for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), and (6), using
the same argument under each subsection: The Quinlan evidence shows that Quinlan
owned the Remax Elite dba when the FSBO was signed. The FSBO names "Remax
vj

Elite" as the party entitled to a commission. As a result, Quinlan, not the Aspenwood
Plaintiffs, was a party to the FSBO and is therefore entitled to the commission. 155
~

That was it.
On appeal, this argument has nearly disappeared-of the 3 6 pages in Chuck's

brief, Chuck's discussion of 60(b )( 4), ( 5), and (6) fills 2 pages. 156 Chuck provided only a
single paragraph per subsection.
Instead of raising the argument he actually made in the lower court, Chuck now
focuses on Rule 60(b )(3). 157 Chuck devotes page after page to revealing what he now
considers an elaborate scheme to prevent him from discovering the Quinlan evidence. He

~

154 L.G. v. State, 2015 UT 41, ,I 9,353 P.3d 131 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
155 See pp. 12-16, supra.
156 Br. of Appellant, 34-36.
157
Id., 26-34.
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also provides new legal arguments citing previously unreferenced cases, statutes, and
regulations regarding his diligence in discovering the Quinlan evidence, the legal effect
of actions by DCCC, and due process concems. 158 These arguments were not provided to
the district court and the district court had no opportunity to rule on them. Consequently,
Chuck cannot raise them on appeal.
II. Aspenwood has standing to maintain this action.

A. Chuck's standing argument may prevail only if no evidence supports the
Plaintiffs' claim to standing.

The Utah Supreme Court declared in 2010 that challenges to standing must be
evaluated using the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation. 159
At this stage of litigation (i.e., after a jury trial has been held, a verdict returned, and a
final judgment entered), the appropriate dispositive motion is a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. 160 Therefore Chuck's challenge to Aspenwood's standing
must be evaluated under the standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. 161
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if no
substantial evidence supports the verdict and the losing party is entitled to judgment as a

158

For example, material presented here but not in the lower court includes additional
allegations of fraud (Br. of Appellant, 28-29); arguments, statutes, and administrative
rules regarding adjudicative proceedings by UDCC (Br. of Appellant, 22-24); and case
law regarding fraud through partial disclosure (Br. of Appellant, 30-31).
159
Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,, 15,228 P.3d 747.
160
Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah
1967).
161
Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14,, 15.
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matter of law. 162 All evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict must be
accepted as true, while conflicting evidence must be disregarded. 163
In addition, the evidence must be taken as it existed at the close of trial, 164 and
appellate courts give deference to factual determinations that affect standing. 165 And,
contrary to Chuck's assertion that Aspenwood has the burden to establish standing, 166
once the judgment against Chuck was entered, the burden of demonstrating a lack of
standing shifted to Chuck. 167
In this case, the standing argument fails because substantial evidence was
introduced at trial showing that Aspenwood has standing. The witnesses Skip Wing and
Tim Shea both testified that Skip was Remax Elite's principal broker, thus satisfying the
~

requirement in Utah Code § 61-2f-305 that the principal broker bring the lawsuit. 168 And
while no testimony was offered to show the registration required by § 42-2-6.6, this
registration can be reasonably inferred from Skip's testimony that Aspenwood owned the
Remax Elite dba and was operating as Remax Elite. 169 Chuck's own counsel referred to
Aspenwood throughout trial as Remax Elite and stated that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's

162

vJ

vJ

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at
568-69.
163
Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 568-69.
164
Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ,r 7, 987 P.2d 22 ("[T]he evidence must be taken
as it existed at the close of the trial .... ") (quoting Townsend v. United States Rubber
Co., 392 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1964)).
165
Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted).
166
Br. of Appellant, 27.
167
Miles v. Miles, 2011 UT App 359, ,r 6, 269 P.3d 958 (internal citation omitted).
168
R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
169
R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21. Pretrial evidence also showed that Aspenwood had
properly registered the Remax Elite dba. R. at 2167-68
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principal broker. 170 In contrast, no evidence was offered at trial to suggest that
Aspenwood did not own or had not properly registered the Remax Elite dba.
Indeed, Chuck did not even attempt at trial to offer evidence showing that Skip
Wing was not Remax Elite's principal broker, that the Remax Elite dba was not properly
registered, or that some other party was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba. 171
Nothing was preventing Chuck from introducing this evidence. Chuck simply abandoned
his standing argument-voluntarily-once the current plaintiffs were added to the case.
As a result, where all trial evidence supports the conclusion that Aspenwood has
standing and no contrary evidence was offered, Chuck's standing argument fails. This is
true despite Chuck's efforts to introduce "newly discovered" evidence nearly a year after
trial.
B. The district court deemed untimely and did not consider evidence on standing
offered for the first time nearly a year after trial.
Standing is a jurisdictional matter that can be raised at any time, including after
trial or on appeal. 172 But evidence supporting a standing argument may be excluded as
untimely .173 And evidence that the district court did not consider cannot be considered on

170

E.g., R. at 8384, pp. 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385,

pp. 64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:1416.
171
Seep. 24, supra.
172
Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, if 2,253 P.3d 1120.
173
See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ,r,r 49-51, 232 P.3d 486 (explaining that district
courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including evidence the court
deems untimely) (internal citations omitted).
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~

~

~

appeal. 174 In this case, Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the
district court deemed untimely and refused to consider. Thus, while standing is an
argument that cannot be waived, Chuck in effect waived his Quinlan argument by failing
to timely offer supporting evidence.
The Dale Quinlan issue first surfaced nearly a year after trial, when Chuck began
VJb

attempting to introduce evidence related to Quinlan's purported ownership of the Remax
Elite dba. This Dale Quinlan evidence purported to establish that Quinlan, not
Aspenwood, was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba (and therefore Quinlan, not
Aspenwood, was somehow entitled to the FSBO commission).
Chuck and Still Standing clearly realized that the Quinlan evidence was crucial to

~

their standing argument-in total, Chuck, Still Standing, or both together submitted six
post-trial motions asking the court to consider the Quinlan evidence. 175
In each instance, the district court absolutely refused to consider the Quinlan
evidence. In doing so, the court found several times that this evidence could have been
discovered with due diligence-findings that Chuck has not appealed. 176
In the end, despite Chuck's tenacity, the court never considered any evidence that
would contradict the facts established at trial: Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal
broker and was entitled to seek a commission. This is a fatal flaw in Chuck's argument.
174

Pilcher v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted
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The Quinlan evidence-which Chuck's standing argument relies upon entirely-may not
be considered on appeal. Without any supporting evidence, Chuck's standing argument
necessarily fails.
C. With due diligence Chuck would have discovered the Quinlan evidence.

As the trial court noted, it is "beyond belief' that Chuck could not have found the
Quinlan evidence with due diligence. 177 While the Quinlan evidence has ballooned into
all manner of purportedly important documents, one alleged fact lies at the argument's
core: the Remax Elite dba was registered in Quinlan's name when Shea and Chuck
signed the FSBO. Therefore, under Chuck's reasoning, Quinlan was "Remax Elite" when
the FSBO was signed, the FSBO identifies Shea's employer as "Remax Elite," and as a
result Quinlan was a party to the FSBO and the only party with standing to pursue a
commission. This argument, which continued throughout all six Quinlan motions, relies
on that one fact, a fact that Chuck could have discovered with due diligence.
Chuck had ample opportunity to discover that the dba was registered in Quinlan's
name-an opportunity that Aspenwood could not have obstructed, even if it wanted to.
As Chuck mentions in his Opening Brief, the status of the Remax Elite dba "vexed the
entire litigation." 178 Indeed, Chuck began investigating the status of the Remax Elite
dba-including its registration documents-as early as December, 2009. 179
Chuck investigated the Remax Elite registration documents to support his
argument that the plaintiff "Remax Elite" was violating the assumed-name statute. Chuck
177

R. at 7013. Ex. A.
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179
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asked the court several times to dismiss the case asserting that because the Remax Elite
dba was not properly registered with the state "Remax Elite' was prohibited from
maintaining a lawsuit.
To support his claim that the Remax Elite dba was not properly registered, Chuck
looked up the dba's registration documents on file with the Utah Department of
Commerce. He offered several of these documents as exhibits to establish the dba's
· registration status. It is beyond belief that during his review of the dba's registration
documents, Chuck would not have come across the document showing registration in
Quinlan's name.
And if Chuck did not find that document, he should have. Where the status of the
l.iP

°

Remax Elite dba "vexed the entire litigation" 18 Chuck should have-at the very
minimum-taken a careful look at the dba's actual registration documents. This
information was a matter of public record. Chuck did not need permission from
Aspenwood, the discovery process, a court order, or any other assistance to obtain the
information.
In other words, the core fact underlying the Quinlan arguments was readily
available to Chuck throughout the entire litigation. And even though the dba' s status was
central to Chuck's pretrial arguments, Chuck either did not review the dba registration
documents thoroughly or simply did not discern at the time the arguments he began
raising a year after trial.
To be sure, Chuck has elaborated on his Quinlan argument, beginning in his
180
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second post-trial Quinlan motion. He argues not only that Quinlan owned the Remax
Elite dba when the FSBO was signed, but that Quinlan never transferred his interest in
that dba to Aspenwood. According to Chuck, this means that Aspenwood is in violation
of the assumed-name statute and that this violation cannot be cured.
But this and all other derivative Quinlan arguments necessarily stem from the
purportedly critical fact that Quinlan originally registered the dba in his name. This
information has always been publicly available. If Chuck missed it, despite years of
litigation dedicated to resolving the status of the Remax Elite dba, he cannot complain
now.
D. Aspenwood's post-trial evidence directly refuted the Dale Quinlan evidence and
corresponding claims.

Even if this Court considers evidence that the district court rejected, that evidence
does not demonstrate a lack of standing. At this point in the litigation, evidence
supporting Aspenwood's standing must be accepted as true Chuck's while conflicting
evidence must be disregarded. 181 But Chuck's brief fails to marshal evidence that was
offered to contradict Chuck's Quinlan claims. This evidence, like Chuck's evidence, was
not considered below and should not be considered here. But if this Court considers the
Quinlan evidence, it must also weigh evidence refuting the Quinlan claim. 182
Once that refuting evidence is considered, the Quinlan arguments fall flat. In short,
Dale Quinlan had nothing to do with this case. 183 It was Aspenwood LLC that purchased
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the right to use the Remax Elite name from Remax International. Aspenwood LLC
assigned Quinlan, as Aspenwood LLC' s agent, to register the Remax Elite dba. Quinlan
registered the dba in his own name by mistake.
Remax International discovered this mistake when Aspenwood attempted to
secure a second Remax franchise. When Remax International discovered the
unacceptable registration, it required that the registration be corrected before it would
license another Remax name to Aspenwood. As a result, Aspenwood assigned Quinlan,
at this point Aspenwood's corporate secretary, to correct the registration. Quinlan did so.
This is confirmed by DCCC documents showing that both Aspenwood Real Estate and
Elite Legacy Corporation owned the Remax Elite dba.
In addition, Quinlan has never asserted that he was the principal broker associated
with the failed transaction. Nor could he, having lost his principal broker's license seven
months earlier. The principal broker actually associated with the FSBO was Skip Wing,
which was established by unopposed trial testimony. 184
To summarize, even if the Quinlan evidence is considered, the remaining evidence
establishes that Quinlan had no involvement with the FSBO, that Quinlan could not have
been the principal broker associated with the FSBO, and that Quinlan never had a right to
the Remax Elite dba. Therefore Chuck's standing argument fails.
E. Even if the untimely evidence is considered, Chuck's arguments fail as a matter
of law.
In a derivative Quinlan argument, Chuck asserts that the assumed-name statute

184
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prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit. According to Chuck, the Remax
Elite dba either has expired or belongs to Still Standing. 185 Even if Chuck has not waived
this argument and some evidence exists that Quinlan owned the dba, that Aspenwood did
not properly register the dba, or that Still Standing now owns the dba, Chuck's argument
still fails, for four reasons:
1. Aspenwood has statutory standing to pursue the commission claim.
2. The assumed-name statute does not bar Aspenwood from maintaining this
action.
3. Any failure to properly register the dba can still be cured.
4. Public policy does not allow cases to be dismissed based on evidence
offered nearly a year after trial.
1. Aspenwood has statutory standing to pursue the commission claim.

Even if Quinlan owned or if Still Standing currently owns the Remax Elite dba,
Aspenwood still has standing to pursue the commission under the principal-broker
statute. Under that statute, when a real estate agent earns a commission, the agent cannot
pursue the commission on its own-only the agent's principal broker may pursue the
commission: "Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission or other compensation
may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales agent or
associate broker is affiliated." 186

The real estate agent in this case was Tim Shea. Thus, under the principal-broker
statute only "the principal broker with whom [Tim Shea] is affiliated" could institute an

185
186
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action to recover the commission.
In this case, the principal broker affiliated with Shea was Skip Wing. 187 Skip's
status as Shea's principal broker was established early on in this case, mostly as a result
of Chuck's efforts to have the case dismissed. Chuck tenaciously maintained that only
Skip Wing could maintain this lawsuit because Skip was Shea's principal broker. Chuck
even went so far as to assert as undisputed fact in a summary judgment motion that Skip
was Shea'-s }. incipal broker. This undisputed fact was confirmed at trial by testin:ony
from both Skip and Shea that Skip was Shea's principal broker. Chuck's own counsel
repeatedly referred to Skip at trial as the principal broker.
Shea's principal broker certainly wasn't Quinlan. Quinlan lost his principal broker
vJ

license in July, 2005-seven months before Shea signed the FSBO. 188 Quinlan continued
to work for Aspenwood, but only as a ground-level real estate agent, just like Shea. This
fact alori•e eliminates Quinlan as the principal broker affiliated with Shea. And if Quinlan
was not the principal broker "with whom [Tim Shea] is affiliated," Quinlan has no
standing to pursue Shea's commission. 189
In addition, Quinlan's purported ownership of the Remax Elite dba does not, as
Chuck asserts, somehow automatically make Quinlan the only possible principal broker
associated with the transaction or the "true FSBO contracting party." According to
Chuck, because Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and because the FSBO listed
"Remax Elite" as a contracting party, the FSBO was actually a contract between Chuck
See p. 24, supra.
188
Seep. 21, supra.
189
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-2-18 (now§ 61-2f-409(2)(b)).
187
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and Quinlan. 190 This assertion relies on an inaccurate legal assumptio~, i.e., that naming a
person in a contract automatically makes that person a party to the contract. 191
In other words, even if "Remax Elite" means Quinlan, Quinlan does not
automatically become a party to the FSBO simply because the FSBO mentions "Remax
Elite." No evidence in this case-including Quinlan's own affidavit-suggests that
Quinlan was even aware of the deal or that Shea was acting on Quinlan's behalf. Instead,
it is undisputed that Shea worked for Aspenwood and that Skip Wing was Shea's
principal broker. If Shea improperly identified Aspenwood as "Remax Elite" in the
FSBO, that does not mean that Shea was ineffectually attempting to bind Quinlan to a
contract Quinlan didn't even know existed. Instead, it would mean only that all parties
executing the transaction did so under the mistake of fact that "Remax Elite" meant
Aspenwood. 192
If Chuck had raised this argument timely, the jury could have-and surely would
have based on the undisputed facts-reformed the transaction documents to say
"Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation" rather than "Remax Elite."
In short, whether the dba registration was in Quinlan's name or not is irrelevant.
Shea earned the commission, and Aspenwood was Shea's principal broker. Under the
principal-broker statute, Aspenwood has standing to pursue the commission.
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2. The assumed-name statute does not prevent Aspenwood from maintaining
this lawsuit.
The assumed-name statute requires a party conducting business under an assumed
name to properly register that name before the party may maintain judicial
proceedings. 193 This statute does not apply to Aspenwood because Aspenwood is not
conducting business under an assumed name.
Clearly Aspenwood conducted business in the past under the assumed name
Remax Elite. This was established by testimony at trial. But the Aspenwood plaintiffs no
longer conduct any business at all: Skip Wing is retired and Aspenwood and Elite Legacy
ceased operating years ago. 194 Where the assumed-name statute applies only to parties
actively conducting business, and where the Aspenwood plaintiffs no longer conduct
business, the assumed-name statute does not apply to the Aspenwood plaintiffs.
More importantly, the pretrial and trial evidence supports the conclusion that
VP

Aspenwood properly maintained its dba during all times that Aspenwood was conducting
business under the name Remax Elite. 195 This includes proper registration at the time this
lawsuit was initiated. 196 But once Aspenwood ceased conducting business as Remax
Elite, the assumed-name statute no longer required Aspenwood to properly register the
Remax Elite dba.
This analysis comports with the assumed-name statute's purpose: to notify the
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public who owns the business and protect those who transact business with the
underlying owner.

197

The Remax Elite dba was properly registered during all times that

Aspenwood was conducting business, and therefore all parties conducting business with
Aspenwood-including Chuck-had notice concerning the use of the assumed name.
Once Aspenwood shut down, there was no longer a need to protect persons transacting
business with Aspenwood (since no business was being transacted at all), and thus no
longer a need to register the Remax Elite dba.
Chuck might counter this argument by suggesting that Aspenwood continues to
conduct business as Remax Elite because Aspenwood is still involved in this litigation.
Indeed, the term "dba Remax Elite" does follow each plaintiffs name in the captions of
Aspenwood's pleadings. 198 But this defect-if it is a defect-can be cured through a
simple instruction to the district court to remove "dba Remax Elite" from the captions. 199
This simple remedy would clarify that the Aspenwood plaintiffs are not conducting
business under an assumed name and are not maintaining this lawsuit under an assumed
name.
In Graham v. Davis County, 200 an unincorporated environmental watch-dog
committee sued a government agency over alleged ORAMA violations. 201 The complaint
was filed in the committee's name, but the committee later amended the complaint to
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make Mr. Graham, a committee member, the plaintiff. 202 The agency argued that the
committee's original complaint was void because the committee had not complied with
the assumed-name statute. 203
The Utah Court of Appeals acknowledged that the original complaint was
defective because the unregistered committee violated the assumed-name statute. 204 But
the Court held that the amendment allowing Graham to replace the committee as plaintiff
cured the violation. 205 As a result, the Court rejected the agency's jurisdictional argument·.
based on the assumed-name statute. 206
Like the amendment in Graham, an amendment to the Complaint in this case
would cure any violation of the assumed-name statute. As a matter of law, the
vJ

Aspenwood Plaintiffs cannot violate the assumed-name statute if they are not conducting
business under the assumed name "Remax Elite" and are not maintaining this lawsuit
under that name. 207 This is true even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and sold it to
Still Standing.
Moreover, the statute requires only that "the provisions of [the assumed-name]
chapter are complied with" before a party may maintain a lawsuit. 208 If the Quinlan
evidence is considered on appeal and accepted as true, that evidence would establish that
the provisions of the chapter have been complied with (i.e., the Remax Elite dba is
Id., 14 _
203 Id.,
1 B.
204
Id. , 11 13-15.
2osld.,~l 6 .
206 Id.
202

207
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registered and active). And if the provisions of the assumed-name chapter are complied
with, the statute is satisfied and allows Aspenwood to maintain its case.
3. Any failure to comply with the assumed-name statute may be cured.

Even if this Court considers the untimely Quinlan evidence and determines that
Still Standing owns the Remax Elite dba, Aspenwood can still cure this defect by
recovering and properly registering the Remax Elite dba. The recovery process would
require time and possibly anoth~r round of litigation (the last thing this favJsuit needs).
But Still Standing's claim to the Remax Elite dba would not withstand judicial scrutiny,
for two reasons: 1) Still Standing's registration of Remax Elite violates the assumedname statute; and 2) even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, Quinlan had no right to
transfer it to Still Standing.
The Utah Code does not allow Still Standing to register the Remax Elite dba if the
dba is misleading regarding Still Standing's business purpose. 209 And the name Remax
Elite applied to Still Standing is certainly misleading. The name "Remax Elite" implies
that the underlying entity is a real estate brokerage and a Remax International franchisee.
Still Standing is obviously not a real estate brokerage and no evidence exists to show that
Still Standing is a Remax International franchisee. As a result, Still Standing's use of the
Remax Elite dba is misleading and§ 42-2-6.6(1)(a) prevents Still Standing from
maintaining that dba.
In addition, Dale Quinlan had no right to assign the Remax Elite dba to Still

209
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Standing. 210 Aspenwood negotiated with and purchased the right to use the Remax Elite
name from Remax International. All rights associated with the Remax Elite name
belonged to Aspenwood. Indeed, when Remax International discovered that Quinlan was
mistakenly listed as the owner of the Remax Elite name, it immediately required that
Aspenwood correct this mistake.
In short, Still Standing claims that it owns the Remax Elite dba, but that claim has
never been tested. If Aspeff-.vood is forced to use the judicial system to reclaim and reregister the Remax Elite dba, it can and will do so. Thus, even if the assumed-name
statute currently prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit, Aspenwood can
cure this defect, making Chuck's argument moot.
4. Public policy does not allow final judgments to be reversed based on
untimely evidence.
As a public policy matter, Chuck's standing argument should not be considered.
~

Dismissing a case based on evidence that was readily available but not offered until
nearly a year after trial sets horrible precedent. Such precedent would disregard the
fundamental protections afforded by the judicial process, including the opportunity to
request documents from opposing parties and to depose adverse witnesses.
Here, Aspenwood has not had these vital protections: Aspenwood had no
opportunity to cross-examine Dale Quinlan, to depose him, to compel his appearance as a
witness, or to subpoena documents from him or from the State of Utah that might
undermine Chuck's new evidence. Quinlan has never appeared in any proceeding in this

210
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case, before, during, or after trial. Aspenwood's lack of opportunity to contest the
Quinlan evidence is prejudicial because the Quinlan evidence leaves critical questions
unanswered:

...

•

Does UDCC have authority to unilaterally reassign ownership of a dba?
No rules or regulations were ever cited to the district court suggesting that
the Department of Corporations has this authority.

•

Who requested the reassignment?

~

What was the basis for the decision to reassign?

•

Did UDCC give notice to potentially affected parties?

•

Did affected parties, including Aspenwood, have an opportunity to be
heard?

•

Who made the final decision to reassign the dba, and was that person a
fair, neutral decision maker?

The Quinlan evidence does not answer these questions. As a result, dismissing this case
relying upon the incomplete Quinlan evidence amounts to a violation of Aspenwood' s
due process rights.
In addition, allowing untimely evidence concerning standing renders "final
judgments" forever unstable. If litigants can dismiss already-decided cases based on
newly discovered standing evidence, virtually every case ever decided remains up in the
air. Surely the judicial system does not allow such a result. Litigation must end sometime,
and final judgments should be just that-final. 211

211

See Kelley v. Kelley, 2010 UT App 236, 160, 9 P.3d 171 (emphasizing public interest
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III.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion.

A district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion
and is "rarely vulnerable to attack.'~ 212 District courts receive broad discretion because
~

60(b) rulings "are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply
fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate
review. " 213
This admonition applies-here~ the district court observed over eight years of
litigation, including Chuck's beyond-relentless litigation strategy, Chuck's opportunity to
discover the Quinlan evidence, Chuck's tendency to submit what the district court called
"cumulative and unnecessary motions," 214 and Chuck's allegations of fraud. Counsel

v;;

cannot hope to even remotely re-create that experience. A case this convoluted does not
lend itse~f to appellate review, justifying the broad discretion afforded to the district
court.

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(b)(3).
Chuck did not preserve this argument for appeal. While Chuck's Rule 60 motion
\ii

listed fraud under 60(b)(3) as a ground for relief, Chuck's supporting memorandum and
oral argument did not provide any argument, analysis, or citation to authority asserting
that relief from judgment was appropriate under Rule 60(b )(3 ). 215 Instead, Chuck asserted
fraud as justification for the timeliness of the motion only. Because Chuck did not request

~
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relief under 60(b)(3), both the district court's oral ruling and written order did not address
it. As a result, Chuck has not preserved for appeal the argument that he is entitled to relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b)(3). 216
Even if he had raised the argument, the district court did not abuse its discretion
under 60(b)(3) because no fraud occurred in connection with Dale Quinlan. As explained
in Section II, Part D, Quinlan had nothing to do with this case. 217 Once all the evidence
regarding Quinlan is considered, it becomes apparent that Quinlan registered the dba ,in
his name by mistake and that Aspenwood owned the right to the dba through a franchise
agreement with Remax International.
In other words, Chuck's suggestion that Aspenwood somehow deceived him
regarding Quinlan's involvement is inaccurate: Quinlan had no association with the
FSBO, was not the principal broker associated with the FSBO, had no right to the Remax
Elite dba, and did not own an interest in or even work for Remax Elite at the time
depositions and discovery were conducted. Indeed, the trial court expressly ruled that
even if the Quinlan evidence was considered, at best this would mean that Quinlan held
the dba for Aspenwood's benefit. 2 1o
In addition, as described in Section II, Part C, it is beyond belief that Chuck could
not have discovered the Quinlan evidence had he exercised due diligence during the years
that the litigation focused on the status of the Remax Elite dba.
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The district court observed all of this and rejected Chuck's allegations of fraudsix times. Where the district court is best positioned to evaluate such fact-sensitive
matters, this Court should defer to the district court's judgment.

B. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(h)(4) or 60(b)(5).
Chuck's arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(5) arguments merely continue
his Quinlan-based standing argument and therefore fail for the same reason: No evidence
regarding Quinlan was admitted by the court and all properly admitted evidence
suggested that Aspenwood owned the commission claim and had standing to pursue that
claim. Moreover, Chuck has not asserted that the district court erred in excluding the
Quinlan evidence or committed clear error in finding that Chuck could have discovered
~

the evidence with due diligence. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Chuck's Quinlan arguments where no Quinlan evidence was
considered.
Further, even if this Court considers the Quinlan evidence, the district court still
did not abuse its discretion under 60(b )( 4) or 60(b )( 5), for three reasons: Aspenwood is

~

the proper party to bring the claim under the principal-broker statute and any ownership
Quinlan had in the Remax Elite dba was for Aspenwood's benefit.
First, as explained in Section II, Part E( 1), under the Utah principal-broker statute,
only the principal broker "with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated"
may sue to recover a commission. 219 It is undisputed that the sales agent's principal
broker was Aspenwood. No evidence-including the Quinlan evidence-suggests that
219
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Quinlan was the principal broker associated with Shea when the FSBO was signed.
Indeed, such a suggestion would be impossible-Quinlan relinquished his principal
broker status seven months before Shea signed the FSBO.
Second, even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, he did so only as an agent for
Aspenwood and for Aspenwood's benefit. 220 As the district court pointed out, after a final
judgment, all facts must be construed in favor ofthatjudgment. 221 Indeed, the court ruled
that the Quinlan could. be construed in a way supporting the judgment: Quinlan registered .
and held the Remax Elite dba in his role as an agent of the company Aspenwood Real
Estate and for Aspenwood's benefit.

222

Where even the Quinlan evidence can be viewed

in a light that supports the final judgment, that evidence does not establish that relief was
appropriate under 60(b)(4) or 60(b)(5) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion under those subsections.
Third, as explained in Section II, Part E( 1), the Quinlan evidence-at bestestablishes only that the FSBO parties signed it under the mistake of fact that "Remax
Elite" meant Shea's employer, Aspenwood. 223

C. The district court did not abuse its discretion under 60(b)(6).
In the lower court, Chuck made three arguments under Rule 60(b )( 6): First, Chuck
should be allowed to "supplement earlier motions with testimony from Dale Quinlan to
explain why the Seller's side was damaged by the conduct of an incompetent agent and
220
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broker."

224

Second, Chuck argued that the judgment should be dismissed based on

Quinlan's failure to mediate. 225 Finally, Chuck argued that earlier rulings regarding
mediation and an assignment agreement should be corrected in light of the Quinlan
evidence. 226
The argument on appeal abandons these three arguments. Instead, Chuck now
combines arguments he makes in other places: Aspenwood violated the principal-broker
statute, Aspenwood violated the assumed-name statute, and Aspenwood concealed
Quinlan during discovery. 227 Chuck asserts that these considerations together justify relief
under 60(b )( 6).
But because Chuck did not present this argument in connection with 60(b)(6)
vJ)

below, he cannot do so here.

228

Further, Chuck raises these arguments elsewhere in his

appeal and they should be considered on their merits there.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Aspenwood was awarded its attorney fees against Chuck in the lower court. If
Aspenwood prevails on appeal, it is entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 229
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CONCLUSION

The district court saw the Quinlan issue for what it was: an unpersuasive, untimely
attempt to introduce evidence that Chuck could have discovered years earlier. Where
Rule 60 motions are generally "saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply
fundamental principles of fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate
review" 230 this Court should defer to the district court's observation that it is "beyond
belief' that Chuck could not have discovered the Quinlan evidence with due diligence.
For this reason, and because even with consideration of the Quinlan evidence the
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion, Aspenwood respectfully requests that the
district court be affirmed.

DATED and SIGNED this 16th day of October, 2015.

Attorneys for Aspenwood
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EXHIBIT A:

Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Chuck's Motion
to Dismiss (first ruling refusing to consider Dale
Quinlan evidence)
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Dismiss based on Settlement
Agreement (second ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan
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Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 52(b)
Motion (third ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan
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Motion (fourth ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan
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Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Stipulated
Motion to Release Bond (fifth ruling refusing to consider Dale
Quinlan evidence)
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Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion (sixth and
final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

i.;i

i.;i
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EXHIBIT A

Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Chuck's Motion to Dismiss
(first ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

RULING & ORDER ON MOTIONS TO CLARIFY AND SCHV ANEVBLDr-S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMMISSION CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION
Case No. 060906802
Page 4 of 10

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Clarify

On June 25, 2013, Still Standing Stables ("SSS")filed its Motion to Clarify Rulings and
Identify Real Parties, and on June 28, 2013, Schvaneveldt filed yet another motion to dismiss for
lack of standing and jurisdiction. As both motions were prepared by attorney Robert Fuller and

contain similar arguments, the court will address them both here.
At the outset, the court expresses its dismay that Schvaneveldt and SSS continue to raise

issues concerning standing after this case has already been through a jury trial and attorney fees

have been awarded. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point during
litigation. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, 12. This court, however, loses jurisdiction once
a final judgment is entered. This court entered a judgment of $212,806.70 against Schvanveldt
on January 2, 2013. This case is over. A jury heard the issues, and the court awarded attorney
fees to the prevailing parties. Issues regarding standing should have been raised years ago.
The Court acknowledges that Defendants, current motions regarding standing are
partially prompted by Plaintiffs, unmeritorious argwnent that Mr. Wing is not a party subject to
liability for the award of attorney fees, but a simple memorandum in opposition to Mr. Wing's
Motion to Clarify should have sufficed. This is precisely the type of cumulative and unnessary
motion that justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to
languish on the court's docket for years.
Despite the court's hesitancy to even address Defendants' standing arguments, the court,
out of an abundance of caution, will briefly address each of Defendants' arguments.
First, on the basis of"reccnt discoveries regarding the true ownership of Remax Elite"
Schvaneveldt argues that none of the plaintiffs were parties to the FSBO or Real Estate Purchase
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Contract (''REPC,,), but rather that the dba "ReMax Elite" was registered to Dale Quinlan
("Quinlan'') at the time the FSBO and REPC were signed, and that Quinlan never transferred the
rights under the agreement to any of the plaintiffs. Raising this question of fact concerning the

standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b),
governing motions for relief from judgment, is instructive here. It states that relief from
judgment based on new evidence is only pennissible if (1) the motion is filed within three
months after the judgment, and (2) due diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in

time for a new trial under Rule 59(b). Judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January
2013. Further, that judgment was entered based on ajury verdict entered in August 2012. Until

this time, all of the parties had agreed that Mr. Wing was the principal broker of ReMax Elite,
the contracting party. In fact, Defendants abandoned their previous arguments regarding
standing once Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a
jury trial and six months after entry of judgment will not be pennitted. Even if this motion were

timely, Schvaneveldt bas provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have
been discovered in time for a rule 59(b) motion. This case was filed in 2006, and the issues
regarding the commission were first raised in 2008. It is beyond belief that Schvaneveldt could
not have discovered this evidence with due diligence.
Even if the court were inclined to consider Schvanveldt' s new factual assertions,
Schvanveldt's evidence attached to his Motion to Dismiss does not contradict the preswnption
that has always been present in this case, i.e., that Mr. Wing was the principal broker associated
with the FSBO. Schvaneveldt's evidence only shows that the dba Remax Elite was transferred to
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Skip Wing a short time after the FSBO and REPC were consummated. It does not show that
Quinlan did not assign the claims at some other time.
Schvaneveldt's tries to establish that Quinlan did not transfer his claims to Mr. Wing by
submitting his July 8, 2013 "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits in Support of: Motion to
Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction" containing an
affidavit of Dale Quinlan. Dale Quinlan states, "I do not believe nor do I have any recollection
of ever assigning any commission agreement or contract rights between myself, doing business
wider the assumed name REMA ELITE, and the Seller, specified above, to any other individual
nor entity." Based on this statement, and his own observations of the signatures, Scbvaneveldt
argues that a transfer never occurred and the letters of transfer "appear to be phoney docwnents
filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations with fraudulent intent."
Even if Rule 60(b) did not bar consideration of Quinlan's affidavit, which it does, the
court never granted leave for Schvaneveldt to file "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits" and
will not consider it, U.R.C.P. 7(c)(l) ("No other memoranda will be considered without leave of
court"), except to note that allegations of forgery and fraud are affinnative defenses which must

be raised in Defendants' Answer. U.R.C.P. 8. Although Defendants' Answer raised issues of
forgery and fraud with respect to the FSBO and REPC, Defendants never raised any such issues
pertaining to any Letter of Transfer; accordingly, such arguments are waived.
Second, SSS argues that because Mr. Wing argues in his Motion to Clarify that he was
not a party to the FSBO, Mr. Wing lacked standing to sue for the commission. Having rejected
Mr. Wing's arguments, however, this issue is moot. The facts and proceduraJ posture of this
case are clear. Mr. Wing as part of the collective "ReMax," sued the defendants for the
1
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commission based on the FSBO, and Mr. Wing is the principal agent ofReMax, that was named
as a party to the FSBO. Accordingly, Mr. Wing has standing to assert the commission claim.
Defendants nearly admitted as much by abandoning their standing arguments once Mr. Wing
was added as a plaintiff.

Third, SSS argues that Elite Legacy Corporation does not have standing to sue because it
was not a party to the FSBO and did not exist when the FSBO and REPC were signed. Elite

Legacy Corporation and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation are separate corporate entities that
owned the dba ReMax Elite at different times. Both corporations have been plaintiffs in this
action ever since the Third Amended Complaint was filed, and both entities were fanned by the
same principal agent, Mr. Wing. The court sees no value in drawing a distinction between them
at this time, when both entities are ultimately controlled by Mr. Wing, who is jointly liable.
Fourth, SSS argues that Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation does not have standing to
sue because it assigned its commission cause of action to Tim Shea. Although "ReMax',

executed an Assignment containing language purporting to transfer "any and all claims,
demands, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever which ReMax has or may have against
Still Standing Stables, LLC," to Tim Shea, it is clear that the parties intended for ReMax to retain
the right 10 pursue the commission claim. Specifically, the Assignment states, ''Tim's lawyer

may represent Tim's interests and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax's offensive
claim .... " (emphasis added). Further, the Assignment contemplates that Tim Shea did not have

the right to bring the commission cause of action, stating " ... the parties agree that it will be best
if Tim prosecutes, collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name .... "

Accordingly, the court interprets the Assignment as giving Tim Shea the right to collect the
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benefits of the commission claim, minus the first $10,000, and the right to direct the prosecution
of the claim, but ReMax retained the right to stand as the formal party asserting the cause of
action. This interpretation is strengthened by the timing of the Assignment, September 2008, the
same month that this court granted ReMax and Sheats first motion to amend but clarified that
only the principal broker could assert the commission claim. Ruling Granting Motion for Leave
to Amend, (September 2, 2008).

Lastly, Defendants insist that Aspenwood and Elite Legacy do not have standing because
they are defunct corporations, and are not "principal brokers. n This is an exact replica of
standing arguments asserted years ago, which Defendants abandoned because Mr. Wing was
added as a plaintiff. Defendants were wise to abandon this argwnent after Mr. Wing was added
as a party, and they should not have resurrected it here. Because Mr. Wing is the principal of
both corporations, and a party to this action, drawing a distinction between them is meaningless.

The parties' requests for a hearing on these matters are denied; oral argument will not
assist the court in deciding the issues herein addressed.
Order & Judgment
Accordingly, Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims
Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction is denied. To the extent that Defendant Still
Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs, commission claim, it is denied.

ro the extent that the parties' seek clarification regarding who is a judgment creditor and who is
ajudgment debtor, the court finds and rules as follows:
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EXHIB1T B

Ruling and Order on Motion to Dismiss based on Settlement Agreement
(second ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

AUG 1 3 20U

SECOND

ISTRICT C URT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HILARY "SKIP WING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO
DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE
COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

vs.
Case No. 060906802
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al.,
Judge Michael D. Lyon
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Defendants Still Standing Stable, L.C., and Chuck
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss All Remmc Elite Counterclaims Based on Settlement
Agreement. Pursuant to the following, Defendants' Motion is denied.
Defendants' motion is based entirely on its new theory, based on new evidence, that a
third party, Dale Quinlan, is the true owner of Plaintiffs' claim, and that Defendants have settled
the matter with Quinlan.
As discussed in this court>s July 22, 2013 Ruling and Order on Motions to Clarify and

Schvaneveldt' s Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and
Jurisdiction, this court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment
wtless, pursuant to rule 60(b), the motion is filed within three months after the judgment and due
diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in time for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
Here, judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 2013 and all of the claims against

L
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Still Standing Stables have long been dismissed. Further, the January judgment was entered
based on a jury verdict entered in August 2012. Accordingly, this motion is untimely.
Even if Defendants' motion was timely, Schvaneveldt has not provided any explanation
for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in time for a Rule 59(b) motion.
Another fatal flaw to consideration of this new evidence.
Lastly, even if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier, settling a claim that
could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate that the plaintiffs in this case did not
have standing to assert their claims. At best the new evidence would raise a material question of
fact concerning proper ownership of the commission claim
The court does not believe that oral argument on this matter will contribute anything to
its understanding of the issues or the law. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a hearing is
denied.

ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss All ReMax Elite
Counterclaims Based on Settlement Agreement is denied. No further order pursuant to rule 7(f)
is required. The court is satisfied that this case is closed.

DATED this ~day o f ~ 2013

RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Case No. 060906802
Page 3 of3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

-1:}_ day of Q~ , 2013, I sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ruling to Plaintiff and Defendant as follows:
Robert J. Fuller
FULLER LAW OFFICE, LC
1090 North 5900 East
Eden, Utah 84310
Attorney for Defendant
Brian P. Duncan
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd. #200
Layton, Utah 84041
Attorney for Plaintiff
Robert R. Wallace
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
60 East South Temple #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorney for Plaintiff

~~~
Deputy Court Cle
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EXHIBIT C

Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion
(third ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

This case was tried with a jury, and so the alternative under Rule

59(a)( 4) that the Court is permitted to consider newly discovered evidence,
provides that the party bringing the motion can only produce evidence that
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial.
That is an issue which has been previously addressed, and this Court's
ruling is not going to depart from the prior rulings ..
And that is, that the information specifically the documentation from
the Department of Corporations, and the information contained in that
documentation, also challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted,
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was
conducted in this case.
The record is abundantly clear that these are all public records. They
have been available to all of the parties throughout these proceedings.
There have been references to the dba registration during the trial.
There is documentation in the record of the Department of Corporations
showing registrations in the corporate names of Elite Legacy and Aspenwood
Real Estate. Those are all part of the record in the public file, and they were

4
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all available, as well as records including the signature of Dale Quinlan,
which would put anyone on notice of his potential interest in those dbas.
And the Court specifically rules that it is under Rule 59 that new
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances.
In this case, the Court's ruling is that the Rule 59 latitude for
modification of findings and conclusions does not apply and is not available.
And even if it were available, would not be justified based upon this
evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, which could reasonably
have been known prior to the trial being conducted.
With respect to Rule 52, which is the specific focus of the motion, and
the motion which the Court has determined to be timely, the Court's ruling is
that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence.
The policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the record of
the trial. And the opportunity to amend or correct, it is the Court's ruling, is
an opportunity to ensure consistency with the trial record, not deviate from
the trial record based upon consideration of additional evidence which was
not considered or presented at trial.
Further, with respect to these particular issues, the Court notes that
when a judgment and verdict are entered, particularly when there is a jury

5
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verdict entered, that any construction of the facts which may be considered
by the Court requires the Court to construe the facts that are found,
consistent with that judgment, and that if there are alternative constructions
of the facts that are possible, from the facts as they are presented, the
Court is required to construe those facts consistent with the judgment which
was entered.
And in this particular case, the Court's ruling with respect to the
present motion is that, as has been demonstrated, there is evidence in the
record of this trial, which is consistent with the determinations that were
made.
There is evidence in the trial in this case, of the registration of the dba
in the names Elite Legacy and Aspenwood Real Estate.

And while there

certainly is documentation with respect to Mr. Quinlan's interest in the dba,
the record of the trial, by acknowledgment of movant's counsel is devoid of
any reference at all to Mr. Quinlan.

And perhaps on that basis alone, it

would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest any modification of the
finding, to burden those findings with additional information relating to Mr.
Quinlan, when none of that information was presented at trial.
Those issues would be issues that may justify a new trial under Rule
59; however that motion ls not before the Court today.
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They may also possibly be considered under Rule 60 as alternate
grounds for relief from judgment, but they do not form a basis for requested
modification under Rule 52(b ).
Further, the Court will make its ruling with respect to some of the
questions relating to the dba.
The Court's ruling is that a dba is an asset.

It is a unique and

intangible asset, but nonetheless it is an asset.
The arguments of the parties have repeatedly made reference to the
dba being owned. That is a reference to its status as an asset, an intangible
personal property asset, and the Court rules that a dba is such an asset, and
it can be owned.
And a dba, like other assets, may be owned or held or transferred by
different parties, under different circumstances, and in different capacities.
The fact that an individual's name Is associated with a particular asset
does not necessarily mean that it is presumptively established that all rights
or attributes of that asset are exclusively held by the individuals in whose
name the asset is held.

It is possible, for example, for assets to be held in a representative
capacity, or as agents for others.

It is also possible for assets to be held in a somewhat segregated
7
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capacity, where a legal title is held in one particular name, but equitable
interests are actually owned by someone else.
There has been nothing suggested in the arguments before the Court
that some other alternative explanation of the ownership, or the listings of
this asset in the name of Mr. Quinlan, could justify exactly the same record
that exists, and support the findings exactly as they were found.
There is evidence, and the evidence has even been discussed, that Mr.
Quinlan was a principal broker for one of the business entities that was
involved. He may very well have been acting as an agent for that business
entity, or his name on that document may be in a representative capacity for
that entity.
And the Court is required again to construe the construction of facts to
be supportive of the judgment, if such a construction is possible.

And the

Court rules, in this case, that it is.
With respect to Mr. Quinlan, therefore, the Court finds the argument
that simply his appearing on the initial application is conclusive of his
ownership interest of all rights associated with that asset, from the time of
the original application through the time of the purported assignment to, Still
Standing Stable, is simply not a persuasive argument.
And the circumstances of this case, in fact, suggest to the contrary
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that he may have been simply functioning in his capacity as a participant in
the business entity that owned the dba of Re/Max Elite, when his name was

placed on that document.
The Court further notes that many of the entities, Re/Max Elite being
one, Elite Legacy being one, Aspenwood Real Estate being one, are all legal
fictions. They are not tangible entities. They are not living and breathing.
They exist as a bundle of legal rights.
And they may represent individuals, they may represent associations
of individuals, they could be represented or effectively owned or controlled
by joint ventures or by partnerships.

A general partnership can be

established by an oral agreement, as can a joint venture.
And all of those are possibilities that could explain the particular name
as it appears on the original application, and be entirely consistent with the
determinations which had previously been made, and the findings of the
Court; and therefore, the Court rules that there has not been a sufficient
showing to justify a modification of the findings as they relate to the

ownership of the dba.
Further, there has been a request for modification of the findings as it
relates to Mr. Skip Wing, based upon his articulation in various statements
that he did not individually own or control the rights that were being
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asserted in the litigation.
That particular position is not disputed, either in the testimony of Mr.
Wing or in the arguments of plaintiff's counsel, and the Court believes that it
is appropriate to make a clarification and modification to the existing rulings
with respect to that issue.
And that clarification will be that, to the extent that Skip Wing is
identified as a party in these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims.,
that identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his representative capacity, as
principal broker for the brokerage, or as an agent or representative of the
brokerage, and does not represent his individual and personal ownership of
those claims.
So the Court is not going to modify the findings to the extent of
excluding his name, but will include the modification that to the extent that

his name is included, that is a representation of his role in connection with
the business entity, and that that role was the role of principal broker,
representative, agent, or authorized representative of the brokerage.
And that clarification will be made, to avoid any conclusion that the
claims that are identified are individually and separately owned by Mr. Wing,
independent of his role in connection with the business entity, and that
modification will be approved.
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EXHIBIT D

Excerpt from ~ uling and. Order o°' Defendants' Rule 6Q(b) Moti on
(fourth rul ing refusing to considex Dale Quinlan eviclence)
•

••
•

'

'

•
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made previous rulings on those issues, and those rulings are not going to be
disturbed by the Court today. There is evidence that is even before the
Court today, including the record of the Department of Corporations, that
shows Legacy Elite as a registered owner of the dba during particular time
periods. There is documentation that shows Aspenwood Real Estate, either
as an LLC or as a corporation, as a registered owner of the dba at various
time. There are documents which purport to assign the dba between those
entities. There is a document, purportedly signed by Mr. Quinlan, that
purports to transfer whatever interest he may have had, whether that was a
bare legal title to the dba that was equitably owned by the corporation
already, or whether it was something else. That kind of information is not
before the Court. But to be consistent with the prior rulings, the Court's
ruling today is that the evidence is sufficient to maintain all of the prior
rulings of the Court with respect to the issues of standing and ownership of
the dba, and those rulings will not be disturbed. The suggestion that all of
the documentation now produced, and the arguments now being made, that
Mr. Quinlan, in fact, has at all times been the real party in interest, and is
the only party that has the right to proceed, are simply not persuasive.
The Court's observation of this case, from the review of the
proceedings up to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is

11
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that this issue of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right
therefore to effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign
them, or compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after
trial. And it is a construct which is based, to a large extent, on a letter,
December 11th, 2013, that the Court has previously made reference to,
which appears to be a deviation from any recognized practice of the
Department of Commerce. It presupposes findings with respect to issues of
forgery, or cutting and pasting of documents. None of those issues have
ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to the Court, and the Court, in
light of both the timing of its presentation, the fact that Mr. Quinlan's
involvement, both in the business entity and in the registration of the dba, is
a matter of public record that has existed for many years, and questions that
the Court has raised with respect to these documents, the Court will simply
not countenance the legal argument that Mr. Quinlan is effectively the
superseding entity with respect to these claims, and that argument is not
given further legal consideration by the Court.
Similarly, the argument with respect to the necessity that the Court
determine that the judgment is void because of failure to comply with the
requirements of mediation, while there have been suggestions that specific
requirements of the mediation rules or statutes may not have technically
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been complied with, there's been no indication that there was any objection
made at the time, or that these issues were even raised until they have now
come up, well after trial, well after the conclusion of that mediation. And
again, based upon a construct to some extent which superimposes Mr.
Quinlan's purported rights into that process, suggesting that the failure of
his participation may also necessarily constitute a failure of the legal
sufficiency of the mediation, the Court simply will not consider those
arguments, based upon the analysis which has previously been made. And
the record before the Court is that a mediation was ordered, and that a
mediation was conducted. Whether there were technical deficiencies in that
mediation, to this Court's knowledge, they weren't ever brought to the
Court's attention in a manner that would have permitted the Court to
address deficiencies with respect to the mediation, or, at the time, that
would have permitted the parties to also address those particular issues.There has been nothing argued to the Court on those points, and the
Court rules that the argument with respect to the insufficiency of the
mediation is not persuasive; therefore, the Court's ruling is that the asserted
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(4), that the judgment itself is void, are
not weH taken. That objection to the form of the judgment is overruled, and
the motion for relief denied. And I believe that is all of the issues that were
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EXHIBITE

Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Stipulated Motion to
Release Bond (fifth ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinl an evidence)

The Court denies the motion, which is a purported stipulated motion to
release the bond or approve the settlement.
And the basis of the Court's ruling is that the purported stipulation
does not properly identify the parties holding the judgment.
There have been significant steps taken by the defendant in this case
to construct an alternative set of facts which would give Mr. Quinlan certain
rights under this judgment and purport to assign those rights to him. None
of those have been established properly by the Court, and the findings which
were previously made by the Court as to the holders of the claim remain
undisturbed. And therefore, Mr. Quinlan does not have authority to act on
behalf of the holders of the claim, based upon the Court's denying the
request to modify the prior rulings, and therefore is not a proper party with
authority to stipulate on issues relating to the bond or any other disposition
of the claim. And so that motion is denied.
ORDER
Based upon the Court's Rulings, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1.

The Rule 52(b) Motion is denied with respect to Defendants'
attempt to introduce the Dale Quinlan dba evidence post-trial, as
there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence. The
policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and
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EXHIBIT F

Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 25(c) Motion
(sixt h and final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

•
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The Order of Court is stated below:
:/··\:::·\;/::
Dated: December 29, 2014
Isl Noels'! Hydit}:./'.'
01 :33:01 PM
District:C§w-.t' Judge
• ._:.:;:.:,:. ~-..~~:••)•l

L. Miles LeBaron (#8982)
Damn T. Morrow (#13812)
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 230
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone: (801) 773-9488
Facsimile: (801) 773-9489

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

Hilary "Skip" Wing, et al,

Plaintiffs.
vs.

Still Standing Stables, L.C., et al.

Defendants.

December 29, 2014 01 :33 PM
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Ruling and Order on November 24, 2014 Hearing of Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion

Civil No. 060906802

Honorable Noel S. Hyde

On November 24. 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on Defendants' Rule
25(c) Motion. Dallin T. Morrow of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. appeared for the Plaintiffs; Robert J.
Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables, L.C.; and Karra J.
Porter appeared for Third-Party Defendant Cathy Code.

Ruling

Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion raises an issue essentially identical to an issue that the
Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still Standing Stables, as the asserted current
owner of the dba "Remax Elite," either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate
administrative determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control the
judgment in this case. Jn past hearings, the court has ruled that the evidence and arguments
supporting these assertions of Still Standing Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not
now properly before the court.

December 29, 2014 01 :33 PM
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The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. As a result, the court rules that Still Standing
Stables' ownership or control of the judgment has not been established, and that the requested
substitution under Rule 25(c) is not appropriate.

Order

Based upon the court's ruling, the court orders that Defendants' motion under Rule 25(c) is
denied.

--END OF ORDER----------------

In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Efiling Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule
lO(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
December 29, 2014 01 :33 PM
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was submitted for electronic
filing, and was thus sent to all counsel of record by email:

Robert R. Wallace
Kirton McConkie
60 East South Temple# l 800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0 l 20

Robert J. Fuller
I 090 No1th 5900 East
Eden, Utah 84310

Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer

Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Scott R. Edgar

1379 North I 075 West, Suite 226

December 29, 2014 01 :33 PM
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Farmington, Utah 84025

@

011

this_ day of December 2014.

/s/ Jessica Ritchie

3

December 29. 2014 01 :33 PM
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